

The Often Imitated, But (Still) Not Yet Duplicated, Revised UCC Article 1[†]

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... Article 1 provides rules that govern all transactions covered by the UCC without regard to their nature. It contains general rules of construction for interpreting the provisions of the entire Code, definitions applicable throughout the Code, a choice of law rule that applies to the other articles to the extent they do not contain their own provisions on choice of law, and a few substantive provisions applicable throughout the entire Code. Its provisions are the coordinating mechanism that holds the Code together, providing a level of commonality across the various substantive Articles of the Code.

Because the provisions of Article 1 apply to the entire Code, the impact of decisions regarding what provisions it includes is greater than that for decisions regarding provisions in individual articles....¹

The ubiquitous nature of Article 1 justifies attention to efforts to revise it. Part One of this paper discusses four notable differences between Revised Article 1 and the version of Article 1 in force until recently in a majority of states and still in effect in seventeen states and the District of Columbia. Part Two gauges how Revised Article 1 has fared thus far in those states that have enacted it, are presently considering enacting it, or have previously considered enacting it. Part Three considers the pros and cons of each notable change, suggests one or more legislative response(s) to each, and briefly analyzes some implications of each response.

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¹ Kathleen Patchel & Boris Auerbach, *The Article 1 Revision Process*, 54 SMU L. REV. 603, 603-04 (2001) (footnotes omitted).

I. Notable Changes in Revised Article 1

There are three notable differences between Revised Article 1 and the pre-revised version of Article 1 still in effect in seventeen states and the District of Columbia. First, Revised Article 1 expressly narrows its own scope, so that it applies only to transactions governed by some other article of the Code. Second, Revised Article 1 – together with its conforming amendments to Articles 2 and 2A – applies the same good faith standard to merchants and non-merchants. Third, Revised Article 1 extends the relevance of course of performance evidence to all agreements governed by the Code. Until recently,² a fourth – and the most notable – difference was that Revised Article 1 purported to allow the parties in any non-consumer transaction to choose the law of any state to govern their transaction, without regard to any relationship (or lack thereof) between that state and either the parties or the transaction.

A. The Scope of Revised Article 1

Unlike pre-revised Article 1, which contains no explicit scope provision, Section R1-102³ states that Revised Article 1 only “applies to a transaction to the extent that it is governed by another article of [the Code].”⁴ In other words, if a transaction does not fall within the scope of Article 2, 2A, 3, 4, 4A, 5, 6 (where still in force), 7, 8, or 9, it is not subject to Revised Article 1.

² In May 2008, the ALI approved a substitute choice-of-law provision, which the NCCUSL had previously approved, that effectively reinstated the pre-revised 1-105. *See* Lance Liebman et al., Proposal to Amend Official Text of § 1-301 (Territorial Applicability; Parties’ Power to Choose Applicable Law) of Revised Article 1 of the UCC (2008), *available at* <http://www.ali.org/doc/uccamendment.pdf> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).

³ For ease of reference, from this point forward, all citations in the text and notes to Revised Article 1 are in the form of “U.C.C. § R1-...” or “Section R1-....” All citations in the text and notes to pre-Revised Article 1 are in the form of “U.C.C. § 1-...” or “Section 1-....” The uniform version of Revised Article 1 can be found in its entirety, with official comments and annotations, in *Uniform Laws Annotated*, 1 U.L.A. 5-52 & S4-S25 (2004 & Supp. 2008), as can the uniform version of pre-Revised Article 1, with its official comments and annotations, 1 U.L.A. 69-352 & S26-35 (2004 & Supp. 2008).

⁴ U.C.C. § R1-102.

This is a departure from current law, notwithstanding the statement by Revised Article 1's drafters that Section R1-102 merely "makes clear what has always been the case – the rules in Article 1 apply [only] to transactions ... governed by one of the other articles of the Uniform Commercial Code."⁵ Pre-revised Section 1-206 requires a signed writing evidencing a contract (other than a security agreement) for the sale of personal property (other than goods and investment securities) if a party wishes to enforce that contract "beyond \$5,000 in amount or value of remedy."⁶ Both the Official Comment to Section 1-206 and numerous court decisions recognize that Section 1-206 – and, by extension, the rest of Article 1 – applies to, *inter alia*, sales of intellectual property rights,⁷ goodwill and other intangibles included in the sale of a going business concern,⁸ franchise rights,⁹ "choses in action,"¹⁰ and other forms of intangible personal property not otherwise covered by the Code.¹¹

⁵ *Id.* § R1-102 cmt. 1; *see also* Patchel & Auerbach, *supra* note 1, at 605 (recognizing that, while current Article 1's scope "implicitly ... has always been that it only governs transactions within the scope of other articles of the UCC ... the lack of an express scope provision occasionally caused courts and commentators to express uncertainty about which transactions are governed by its substantive rules").

⁶ U.C.C. § 1-206(1)-(2).

⁷ *See, e.g.*, Grappo v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 56 F.3d 427, 431 (2d Cir. 1995); Mellencamp v. Riva Music Ltd., 698 F. Supp. 1154, 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

⁸ *See, e.g.*, Olympic Junior, Inc. v. David Crystal, Inc., 463 F.2d 1141, 1143 (3d Cir. 1972); Beldengreen v. Ashinsky, 528 N.Y.S.2d 744, 746-47 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987).

⁹ *See, e.g.*, American Buick, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 66 S.W.3d 51, 60-61 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).

¹⁰ *See, e.g.*, Sel-Lab Mktg., Inc. v. Dial Corp., 48 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 482, 485-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (right of first refusal); *see also In re Furst*, 914 F. Supp. 734, 737 (D. Mass. 1996) (royalty rights).

¹¹ *See, e.g.*, FDIC v. Herald Square Fabrics Corp., 439 N.Y.S.2d 944, 951-52 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (sale of chattel paper not given as collateral). *See generally* U.C.C. § 1-206 cmt. (stating that Section 1-206's purpose is to "fill the gap" left by statute of frauds provisions elsewhere in the Code – principally "relat[ing] to the sale of general intangibles").

If this were not the case, there would be scant need for Section 1-206. And, given the choice between construing Section 1-206 to apply to transactions not otherwise governed by the Code and construing Section 1-206 to be surplusage, the chief architect of the Uniform Commercial Code advocated the former. *See* Karl N. Llewellyn,

B. Good Faith Under Revised Article 1

Both pre-revised and Revised Article 1 impose a duty of good faith performance and enforcement on all parties to any agreement governed by the Code.¹² However, pre-revised Article 1 and Revised Article 1 define “good faith” differently. Pre-revised Section 1-201 defines good faith as “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.”¹³ The question under pre-revised Article 1 is whether the person was subjectively truthful and behaved honestly.¹⁴ In addition to this requirement of subjective honesty, Revised Article 1 also requires that every party “observ[e] reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”¹⁵ Thus, Revised Article 1 applies the same standard of good faith to non-merchants that current Articles 2 and 2A apply only to merchants.¹⁶

Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950) (“If a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light of some assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective, is nonsense.”).

¹² Compare U.C.C. § 1-203 with U.C.C. § R1-304.

¹³ U.C.C. § 1-201(19).

¹⁴ See Margaret L. Moses, *The New Definition of Good Faith in Revised Article 1*, 35 U.C.C.L.J. 47, 48-49 (2002); see, e.g., *Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc.*, 930 S.W.2d 157, 175 (Tex. App. 1996) (“[T]he test for good faith, i.e., honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction, is the actual belief of the party in question, not the reasonableness of the belief.” (citing *La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat’l Bank of Mercedes*, 673 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Tex. 1984)); *Town & Country State Bank of Newport v. First State Bank of St. Paul*, 358 N.W.2d 387, 392 (Minn. 1984) (holding that U.C.C. § 1-201(19) imposes “a subjective test, requiring honesty of intent rather than absence of circumstances which would put an ordinarily prudent holder on inquiry.” (quotation omitted)).

¹⁵ U.C.C. § R1-201(b)(20) (“‘Good faith’ ... means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”).

¹⁶ Compare U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (“‘Good faith’ in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”) and *id.* § 2A-103(3) (incorporating § 2-103’s good faith standard by reference) with *id.* § 1-201(19) (“‘Good faith’ means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.”); see, e.g., *Ledbetter v. Darwin Dobbs Co.*, 473 So. 2d 197, 201 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985); *Hammer v. Thompson*, 129 P.3d 609, 617 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (both recognizing that Article 2 holds merchants to a higher standard of good faith than Article 1 holds nonmerchants). See generally Moses, *supra* note 14, at 51-52.

Suppose I sign a contract to purchase a home spa from Sears and that I further agree to make monthly payments for a fixed term, to maintain the spa for the duration of the payment period, and to promptly notify Sears of any non-routine maintenance needs that arise for the duration of the express warranty that is part of the sales agreement. Under Revised Article 1, not only must Sears (the merchant seller) observe reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing, so must I (the non-merchant buyer) – even though I may have no reason to know reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the sale and servicing of home spas. If the relevant standards require that I inspect the home spa every few days and I fail to inspect the spa for two weeks because I am on vacation, when I return home and find the spa not working as warranted, am I breaching my duty of good faith by insisting that Sears make good on its warranty? Revised Article 1’s reasonable-person-with-knowledge-of-the-trade standard suggests I am in breach.¹⁷

C. Course of Performance Under Revised Article 1

The text of pre-revised Article 1 refers to course of performance only as one possible element of an “agreement.”¹⁸ Otherwise, Articles 2 and 2A define and operationalize course of performance.¹⁹ As a result, there has been some uncertainty about what role course of

¹⁷ See generally Moses, *supra* note 14, at 50-51 (reaching a similar conclusion juxtaposing the “honesty in fact” test of former U.C.C. Article 3 with the “honesty in fact and ... observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing” test of current U.C.C. § 3-103(1)(d)). If I am in breach, my breach will not give Sears independent grounds to recover from me, but it may well give Sears a defense to excuse it from liability for its breach of warranty. See U.C.C. § R1-304 cmt. 1; see also Moses, *supra* note 14, at 48 n.6.

¹⁸ U.C.C. § 1-201(3). The official comments to a few sections of current Article 1 mention course of performance; but, they generally do so in the context of discussing the meaning of “agreement,” see U.C.C. §§ 1-102 cmt. 2 & 1-204 cmt. 2; and, like the definition of “agreement,” they refer the reader seeking the meaning of “course of performance” to U.C.C. § 2-208, see U.C.C. §§ 1-102 cmt. 2 & 1-205 cmt. 2.

¹⁹ See *id.* §§ 2-208 & 2A-207.

performance plays in transactions governed by Article 3, 4, 4A, 5, 6, 8, or 9²⁰ and how course of performance fits into the hierarchy set forth in current Section 1-205.²¹ Revised Article 1 resolves any uncertainty by defining course of performance and fixing its position in the hierarchy of express and implied terms of any agreement governed by the Code.²²

D. Choice of Law Under Revised Article 1

Both pre-revised and Revised Article 1 empower the parties to agree on governing law, subject to certain limitations. Where pre-revised and Revised Article 1 parted ways until recently was that, while pre-revised Article 1 requires the parties to choose the law of a jurisdiction that is reasonably related to the transaction,²³ Revised Article 1, as the ALI and NCCUSL originally promulgated it, required no such relationship between the transaction and

²⁰ Compare, e.g., *National Livestock Credit Corp. v. Schultz*, 653 P.2d 1243 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982) (affirming the trial court's resort to course of performance evidence in resolving a dispute governed by Article 9) with, e.g., *Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Middlesboro Motor Sales, Inc.*, 424 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Ky. 1968) (“[U.C.C. § 2-208] deals with sales only. As to secured transactions the code apparently does not contain a rule for varying the contract by performance.”).

²¹ See U.C.C. § 1-205(4); see, e.g., *Farmers State Bank v. Farmland Foods*, 402 N.W.2d 277, 281 (Neb. 1987) (“[P]ostagreement course of performance is not governed by § 1-205(4).”). See generally Nicholas M. Insua, Note, *Dogma, Paradigm, and the Uniform Commercial Code: Sons of Thunder v. Borden Considered*, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 249, 282-83 (1999) (“In contracts for the sale of goods, section 2-208 adds ‘course of performance’ to the agreement confluence, falling between express terms and course of dealing in the ‘lexical ordering’ created by section 1-205(4).” (footnotes omitted)); David Frisch & Henry D. Gabriel, *Much Ado About Nothing: Achieving Essential Negotiability in an Electronic Environment*, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 747, 765 n.76 (1995) (“Although the definition of ‘agreement’ in section 1-201(3) includes usage of trade, course of dealing and course of performance, the definition of course of performance appears in section 2-208 and the concept is conspicuously absent from the interpretational priority set out in section 1-205(4). It is therefore open to question whether course of performance was intended to be part of the definition of agreement when that term appears outside of Article 2.” (citations omitted)).

²² U.C.C. § R1-303(a), (d) & (e). See generally Patchel & Auerbach, *supra* note 1, at 610 (“Although the comments to pre-revision Section 1-205 refer to course of performance, the section itself deals with only course of dealing and usage of trade. The Revision remedies this omission by adding course of performance to course of dealing and usage of trade as relevant in ascertaining the meaning of the parties’ agreement and supplementing its express terms.” (footnote omitted)).

²³ See U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation, the parties may agree that the law of this state or of such other state or nation governs their rights and duties.”).

the chosen jurisdiction,²⁴ unless one or more parties to the agreement at issue is a consumer.²⁵ In so doing, the original version of Revised Article 1 ignored the general tendency of states to allow parties to choose only the law of a jurisdiction bearing some relationship to the parties, to the transaction, or both, and then only if the chosen law does not conflict with some fundamental public policy of a state bearing a greater relationship to the dispute than the chosen state.²⁶ As one leading commentator put it, original R1-301 was “far broader, cover[s] far more contracts, and (by sheer force of numbers of contracts implicated) [was] less deferential to the ordinarily-governing law of other jurisdictions than any widely-known conflict of laws rule[] anywhere.”²⁷

²⁴ See U.C.C. § R1-301(c)(1) (2001).

²⁵ See *id.* § R1-301(e)(1).

Under original Revised 1-301, if Sears is headquartered in Illinois, I reside in Nevada, and I purchase the home spa from a Sears store in Las Vegas, then a provision in the sales agreement subjecting all disputes to Maine law would not bind me because I am a consumer; but, if Sears purchased the spa for resale from The Wizard of Spas, located in Kansas, and The Wizard of Spas shipped directly to the Las Vegas Sears store, then a similar provision in the Sears-The Wizard of Spas agreement would bind both parties because neither is a consumer.

²⁶ See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1969); see, e.g., 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-105(1) (West 2004) (requiring that the “transaction bear[] a reasonable relation” to the chosen state); *Sievers v. Diversified Mortgage Investors*, 603 P.2d 270, 273 (Nev. 1979) (“Under choice-of-law principles, parties are permitted within broad limits to choose the law that will determine the validity and effect of their contract. The situs fixed by the agreement, however, must have a substantial relation with the transaction, and the agreement must not be contrary to the public policy of the forum.” (citations omitted)). See generally Richard K. Greenstein, *Is the Proposed U.C.C. Choice of Law Provision Unconstitutional?*, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1159 (2000).

²⁷ William J. Woodward, Jr., *Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative Choice in an Era of Party Autonomy*, 54 SMU L. REV. 697, 740 (2001). Professor Woodward cautioned that the original R1-301

states a rule for any case subject to the Uniform Commercial Code, unless displaced by a specified provision elsewhere in the UCC. This means that all sales and leases of goods contracts will be covered, as will contracts in all the other areas covered by the Uniform Commercial Code. Thus the provision will be available for a large percentage of the staggeringly large number of commercial contracts formed in our economy every day. There are no size or value limitations. Parties to every commercial contract from the sale to a carpenter of a screwdriver to the large-scale business liquidation sale will be able to choose unrelated law to cover their transaction.

Id. at 740-41 (footnotes omitted). Another commentator has argued that state choice-of-law rules should generally defer to the parties’ contractual choice of law. See Jack M. Graves, *Party Autonomy in Choice of Commercial Law: The Failure of Revised U.C.C. § 1-301 and a Proposal for Broader Reform*, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 59 (2005).

II. News from the Front: Revised Article 1 in the States

As of April 10, 2009, Revised Article 1 was in effect in Alabama,²⁸ Arizona,²⁹ Arkansas,³⁰ California,³¹ Colorado,³² Connecticut,³³ Delaware,³⁴ Florida,³⁵ Hawaii,³⁶ Idaho,³⁷ Illinois,³⁸

²⁸ ALA. CODE §§ 7-1-101 to 7-1-310 (2006).

²⁹ ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-1101 to 47-1310 (Supp. 2009).

Revised Article 1 was also introduced in Arizona in 2005, *see* SB 1234, *available at* <http://www.azleg.state.az.us/legtext/47leg/1r/bills/sb1234p2Epdf> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). That bill was referred to committee on January 25, *see* <http://www.azleg.state.az.us/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/legtext/47leg/1r/bills/sb1234o%2Easp> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009), from which it never emerged. In March 2005, Morton Scult, a partner with Phoenix's Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP and Chair of the State Bar of Arizona Business Law Section's UCC Committee, reported that SB 1234 had been "held" because of opposition to the new good faith definition in R1-201(b)(20) and "w[ould] not get out of committee this session." E-mail from Morton Scult to Keith A. Rowley, Mar. 7, 2005 (on file with the author). Not coincidentally, it seems, the version enacted in 2006 does not adopt the new good faith definition. *See infra* note 71.

³⁰ ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-1-101 to 4-1-310 (West Supp. 2009).

³¹ CAL. COM. CODE §§ 1101 to 1310 (West Supp. 2009).

³² COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-1-101 to 4-1-310 (West Supp. 2008).

³³ CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-1-101 to 42a-1-310 (West Supp. 2008).

³⁴ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1-101 to 1-310 (2005).

³⁵ FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 671.101 to 671.213 (West Supp. 2009).

The Florida House and Senate each considered Article 1 bills during the 2006 legislative session. *See* HB 1437, *available at* http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loadoc.aspx?FileName=_h1437c1.doc&DocumentType=Bill&BillNumber=1437&Session=2006 (last visited Apr. 10, 2009); SB 2716, *available at* <http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/2006/Senate/bills/billtext/pdf/s2716.pdf> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). Each bill died in committee in their respective chambers.

³⁶ HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 490:1-101 to 490:1-310 (West 2008).

³⁷ IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 28-1-101 to 28-1-310 (West 2006).

³⁸ 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-101 to 5/1-310 (West Supp. 2009).

The Illinois legislature previously considered, but failed to enact, Revised Article 1. On April 15, 2005, the Illinois Senate unanimously passed SB 1647. <http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/94/SB/PDF/09400SB1647lv.pdf> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). SB 1647 was read for the first time in the Illinois House on April 26, 2005 and referred to the Rules Committee, to which it was re-referred on May 13, 2005, after languishing without action on the House Executive Committee's docket. The Rules Committee took no further action before the 94th General Assembly adjourned sine die on January 9, 2007. *See* <http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/billstatus.asp?DocNum=1647&GAID=8&GA=94&DocTypeID=SB&LegID=19742&SessionID=50> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).

Indiana,³⁹ Iowa,⁴⁰ Kansas,⁴¹ Kentucky,⁴² Louisiana,⁴³ Minnesota,⁴⁴ Montana,⁴⁵ Nebraska,⁴⁶ Nevada,⁴⁷ New Hampshire,⁴⁸ New Mexico,⁴⁹ North Carolina,⁵⁰ North Dakota,⁵¹ Oklahoma,⁵²

³⁹ IND. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-1-101 to 26-1-1-302 (West Supp. 2008).

As introduced, Indiana P.L. 143 (née SB 419) included uniform R1-301. It was subsequently amended to, *inter alia*, replace uniform R1-301 with language consistent with pre-Revised 1-105. See <http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2007/PDF/Srollcal/5749.PDF.pdf> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009); <http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2007/PDF/SCR/AM041902.001.pdf> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). The amendments also struck Section 7 of the introduced bill, which would have deleted IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-2-103(1)(b) and had the effect of holding Article 2 merchants to an “honesty in fact” good faith standard.

⁴⁰ IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 554.1101 to 554.1310 (West Supp. 2008).

⁴¹ KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 84-1-101 to 84-1-310 (West 2008).

As introduced, Chapter 89 (née SB 183) included uniform R1-301. It was subsequently amended to, *inter alia*, replace uniform R1-301 with language consistent with pre-Revised 1-105. See 2007 S.J. 169-70, available at <http://www.kslegislature.org/journals/2007/sj0219.pdf> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). During its 2005-06 session, the Kansas legislature considered a Revised Article 1 bill including uniform R1-301. See HB 2453, available at <http://www.kslegislature.org/bills/2006/2453.pdf> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). HB 2453 was introduced on February 11, 2005, see <http://www.kslegislature.org/journals/2005/hj0211.pdf> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009), and referred to committee on February 14, see <http://www.kslegislature.org/journals/2005/hj0214.pdf> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). No further action was reported before the legislature adjourned sine die.

⁴² KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 355.1-101 to 355.1-310 (West Supp. 2008).

⁴³ LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:1-101 to 10:1-310 (Supp. 2009).

⁴⁴ MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 336.1-101 to 336.1-310 (West Supp. 2009).

⁴⁵ MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-1-101 to 30-1-310 (2007).

⁴⁶ NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. U.C.C. §§ 1-101 to 1-310 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008).

⁴⁷ NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 104.1101 to 104.1310 (LexisNexis 2007).

⁴⁸ N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 382-A:1-101 to 382-A:1-310 (Supp. 2008).

⁴⁹ N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-1-101 to 55-1-310 (West Supp. 2008).

⁵⁰ N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-1-101 to 25-1-310 (West Supp. 2008).

⁵¹ N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-01-01 to 41-01-24 (West 2008).

The North Dakota legislature considered a version of Revised Article 1 in 2005, see SB 2143, available at <http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/59-2005/bill-text/FANA0100.pdf> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009), but the North Dakota Senate rejected it by a margin of 45-1, see <http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/59-2005/bill-actions/ba2143.html> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).

⁵² OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12A, §§ 1-101 to 1-310 (West Supp. 2009).

Pennsylvania,⁵³ Rhode Island,⁵⁴ South Dakota,⁵⁵ Tennessee,⁵⁶ Texas,⁵⁷ Utah,⁵⁸ Vermont,⁵⁹ Virginia,⁶⁰ and West Virginia,⁶¹ and bills proposing its enactment were pending in the Alaska,⁶² Maine,⁶³ Oregon,⁶⁴ and Washington⁶⁵ legislatures.

⁵³ 2008 Pa. Legis. Serv. 41 (West) (to be codified at 13 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1101 to 1310).

⁵⁴ R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 6A-1-101 to 6A-1-310 (West Supp. 2009).

⁵⁵ S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 57A-1-101 to 57A-1-310 (Supp. 2008).

The South Dakota legislature previously considered a Revised Article 1 bill in 2007. SB 85, *available at* <http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2007/bills/SB85p.pdf> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009), was introduced on January 18, 2007. On February 2, the Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously voted to defer consideration of SB 85 until 2008, so that the South Dakota Bar Association's Business Law Committee could review and comment on it. *See* <http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2007/cmminute/minSJU02021000.htm#13531> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). The South Dakota Legislature adjourned sine die on March 26 without any further action on SB 85. *See* <http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2007/index.aspx> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).

⁵⁶ TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1-101 to 47-1-310 (West Supp. 2009).

⁵⁷ TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101 to 1.310 (Vernon Supp. 2008).

⁵⁸ UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70A-1a-101 to 70A-1a-310 (West Supp. 2008).

⁵⁹ VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, §§ 1-101 to 1-310 (West Supp. 2008).

⁶⁰ VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.1A-101 to 8.1A-310 (West Supp. 2008).

⁶¹ W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-1-101 to 46-1-310 (West Supp. 2007).

⁶² HB 102 (to be codified at ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.01.111 to 45.01.310 if enacted), *available at* <http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/26/Bills/HB0102B.PDF> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).

⁶³ LD 1403 (to be codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.11, §§ 1-1101 to 1-1310 if enacted), *available at* http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/bills_124th/billtexts/SP050601.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). As of April 10, the on-line version of LD 1403 only provides the text for the conforming amendments to the rest of the Maine Uniform Commercial Code; it does not provide the Article 1 text. Presumably, this will eventually be remedied.

⁶⁴ SB 558 (to be codified at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 71.101 to 71.310 if enacted), *available at* <http://www.leg.state.or.us/09reg/measpdf/sb0500.dir/sb0558.a.pdf> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).

⁶⁵ SB 5155 (to be codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 62A.1-101 to 62A.1-310 if enacted), *available at* <http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2009-10/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/5155.pdf> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).

A. Adoptions to Date

The versions of Revised Article 1 enacted in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia embrace the narrowed scope of uniform R1-102,⁶⁶ extend course of performance to all transactions governed by the Code,⁶⁷ and reject uniform R1-301's choice of law provision⁶⁸ – opting, instead, to retain the essence of

⁶⁶ See ALA. CODE § 7-1-102 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-1102 (Supp. 2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-1-102 (West Supp. 2009); CAL. COM. CODE § 1102 (West Supp. 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-1-102 (West Supp. 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-1-102 (West Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1-102 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 671.101(2) (West Supp. 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 490:1-102 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-1-102 (West 2006); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102 (West Supp. 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-1-101(2) (West Supp. 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.1102A (West Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-1-102 (West 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.1-102 (West Supp. 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-102 (Supp. 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.1-102 (West Supp. 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-101(4) (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. U.C.C. § 1-102 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 104.1102 (LexisNexis 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:1-102 (West Supp. 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-1-102 (West Supp. 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-102 (West Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 41-01-02 (West 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12A, § 1-102 (West Supp. 2009); 2008 Pa. Legis. Serv. 41, 52 (West) (to be codified at 13 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6A-1-102 (West Supp. 2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-1-102 (Supp. 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1-102 (West Supp. 2009); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.102 (Vernon Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-1a-102 (West Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 1-102 (West Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1A-102 (Supp. 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-1-102 (West Supp. 2008).

⁶⁷ See ALA. CODE § 7-1-303; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-1303; ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-1-303; CAL. COM. CODE § 1303; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-1-303; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-1-303; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1-303; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 671.205; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 490:1-303; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-1-303; 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-303; IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-1-205; IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.1205; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-1-303; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.1-303; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-303; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.1-303; MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-205; NEB. REV. STAT. U.C.C. § 1-303; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 104.1303; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:1-303; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-1-303; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-303; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 41-01-17; OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12A, § 1-303; 2008 Pa. Legis. Serv. 41, 59 (to be codified at 13 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6A-1-303; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-1-303; TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1-303; TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.303; UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-1a-303; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 1-303; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1A-303; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-1-303.

⁶⁸ Compare ALA. CODE § 7-1-301; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-1301; ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-1-301; CAL. COM. CODE § 1301; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-1-301; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-1-301; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1-301; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 490:1-301; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-1-301; 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-

former Section 1-105, which requires some reasonable relation between the state whose law the parties choose by agreement and the transaction the parties wish to subject to that law.⁶⁹

The only division in the ranks of states that have enacted Revised Article 1 to date is over the definition of “good faith.” Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New

301; IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-1-301; IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.1105; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-1-301; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.1-301; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-301; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.1-301; MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-301; NEB. REV. STAT. U.C.C. § 1-301; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 104.1301; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:1-301; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-1-301; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-301; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 41-01-15; OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12A, § 1-301; 2008 Pa. Legis. Serv. 41, 58 (to be codified at 13 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6A-1-301; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-1-301; TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1-301; TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.301; UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-1a-301; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 1-301; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1A-301; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-1-301 *with* U.C.C. § 1-301 (2001); *see also* FLA. STAT. ANN. § 671.105 (West 2004) (unchanged by the 2007 amendments).

The original version of New Hampshire HB 719 included uniform R1-301, HB 719, § 1 (copy on file with the author), as did 2005’s ill-fated Arizona SB 1234, *see supra* note 29, and Kansas HB 2453, *see supra* note 41, and 2004’s Massachusetts HB 91, *see infra* note 83. New Hampshire HB 719 only passed after the language of uniform R1-301 was replaced by the current language, which tracks pre-Revised 1-105. Arizona enacted a version of Revised Article 1 in 2006 that replaced uniform R1-301 with language tracking pre-Revised 1-105. *See* ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-1301. The Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, and Utah senates each took up bills in 2007 that originally included uniform R1-301. Each bill was amended to replace uniform R1-301 with language tracking pre-Revised 1-105 before it progressed to a floor vote. All four bills were enacted as amended. *See supra* notes 39, 40, 41 & 58, respectively. 2007’s ill-fated South Dakota SB 85 also included uniform R1-301. *See* SB 85, *supra* note 55, § 15.

⁶⁹ *See* ALA. CODE § 7-1-105 (2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-1105 (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-1-105 (West 2004); CAL. COM. CODE § 1105 (West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-1-105 (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-1-105 (West 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1-105 (1999 & Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 671.105 (West 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 490:1-105 (LexisNexis 2002); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-1-105 (2001); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-105 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-1-105 (West 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.1105 (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-1-105 (Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.1-105 (LexisNexis 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-105 (2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.1-105 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-105 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. U.C.C. § 1-105 (LexisNexis 2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 104.1105 (LexisNexis 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:1-105 (West 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-1-105 (LexisNexis 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-105 (West 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-15 (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12A, § 1-105 (West 2004); 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1105 (West 1999 & Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6A-1-105 (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-1-301 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1-105 (West 2002); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105 (Vernon 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-1-105 (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 1-105 (West 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1-105 (West 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-1-105 (West 2002).

As of April 10, 2009, only the U.S. Virgin Islands had adopted uniform R1-301. *See* V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 11A, § 1-301 (2003). In response to this nearly-unanimous rejection of uniform R1-301, NCCUSL and the ALI promulgated a substitute uniform R1-301 that, as so many states have already done while enacting most of Revised Article 1, retains the essence of former Section 1-105. *See supra* note 2.

Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia have adopted uniform R1-201(b)(20) and conforming amendments to Articles 2 and 2A that, collectively, eliminate the bifurcated good faith standard in Articles 2 and 2A and hold merchants and non-merchants alike to “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”⁷⁰ Alabama, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia opted for a bifurcated good faith standard by retaining the pre-R1 “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned” definition in Article 1 and leaving 2-103(1)(b) & 2A-103(3) unchanged.⁷¹

⁷⁰ See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-1-201(b)(20) (West Supp. 2009); CAL. COM. CODE § 1201(b)(20) (West Supp. 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-1-201(b)(19) (West Supp. 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-1-201(b)(20) (West Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1-201(b)(20) (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 671.201(20) (West Supp. 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.1201(2)(t) (West Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-1-201(b)(20) (West 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.1-201(2)(t) (West Supp. 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-201(b)(20) (Supp. 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.1-201(b)(20) (Supp. 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-201(2)(u) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 104.1201(2)(t) (LexisNexis 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:1-201(b)(20) (West Supp. 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-1-201(b)(20) (West Supp. 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-201(b)(20) (West Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 41-01-09(2)(t) (West 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12A, § 1-201(b)(20) (West Supp. 2009); 2008 Pa. Legis. Serv. 41, 54 (West) (to be codified at 13 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1201(b)(20)); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-1-201(b)(20) (Supp. 2008); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(b)(20) (Vernon Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 1-201(b)(20) (West Supp. 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-1-201(b)(20) (West Supp. 2008).

⁷¹ See ALA. CODE § 7-1-201(b)(20) (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-1201(B)(20) (Supp. 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 490:1-201(b) (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-1-201(b)(20) (West 2006); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-201(b)(20) (West Supp. 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-1-201(19) (West Supp. 2008); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6A-1-201(b)(20) (West Supp. 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1-201(b)(20) (West Supp. 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-1a-201(2)(t) (West Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1A-201(b)(20) (Supp. 2008).

If enacted in its current form, Indiana SB 501 would further tilt the balance in favor of the uniform R1-201(b)(20) “good faith” definition. Introduced in January 2009 to propose the enactment of the 2002 amendments to UCC Articles 3 and 4, SB 501 also proposes amending Indiana’s Article 1 definition of “good faith” to require “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.” SB 501, § 1, *available at* <http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2009/PDF/ES/ES0501.1.pdf> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). SB 501 passed the Indiana Senate on February 10. On April 9, the House Financial Institutions Committee recommended passage with amendments. See <http://www.in.gov/apps/lisa/session/billwatch/billinfo?year=2009&request=getActions&doctype=SB&docno=0501> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). The House committee’s recommended amendments consist almost entirely of matters unrelated to the Uniform Commercial Code. See <http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2009/PDF/HCRP/CR050101.001.pdf> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). As such, it is difficult to gauge the likelihood that the bill will pass the Indiana House as amended; and, if so, whether the Indiana Senate will concur.

B. Pending Legislation

The versions of Revised Article 1 pending in Alaska, Oregon, and Washington embrace the narrowed scope of uniform R1-102,⁷² extend course of performance to all transactions governed by the Code,⁷³ and choose uniform R1-201(b)(20)'s unitary good faith standard.⁷⁴ Alaska HB 102 and Oregon SB 558, consistent with the thirty-four previous enactments, reject uniform R1-301 in favor of choice of law provisions that generally resemble pre-Revised 1-105.⁷⁵ Washington SB 5155, as introduced, ignores the thirty-four previous enactments and NCCUSL's and the ALI's promulgation of substitute 1-301, and incorporates the original version of R1-301.⁷⁶

As of April 10, the version of Maine LD 1403 available on the Maine Legislature's web site does not set forth the text of the revisions to Maine's version of Article 1.⁷⁷ As such, I cannot comment on its content.

⁷² See HB 102, *supra* note 62, § 8 (to be codified at ALASKA STAT. § 45.01.112 if enacted); SB 558, *supra* note 64, § 2 (to be codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 71.102 if enacted); SB 5155, *supra* note 65, § 2 (to be codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.1-102 if enacted).

⁷³ See HB 102, *supra* note 62, § 9 (to be codified at ALASKA STAT. § 45.01.303 if enacted); SB 558, *supra* note 64, § 16 (to be codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 71.303 if enacted); SB 5155, *supra* note 65, § 16 (to be codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.1-303 if enacted).

⁷⁴ See HB 102, *supra* note 62, § 9 (to be codified at ALASKA STAT. § 45.01.211(b)(22) if enacted); SB 558, *supra* note 64, § 8 (to be codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 71.201(t) if enacted); SB 5155, *supra* note 65, § 8 (to be codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.1-201(20) if enacted).

⁷⁵ See HB 102, *supra* note 62, § 9 (to be codified at ALASKA STAT. § 45.01.301 if enacted); SB 558, *supra* note 64, § 14 (to be codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 71.301 if enacted).

⁷⁶ See SB 5155, *supra* note 65, § 14 (to be codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.1-301 if enacted).

⁷⁷ See *supra* note 63.

C. Prospects for Additional Adoptions in 2009

Alaska HB 102 was introduced on January 30, 2009, and promptly referred to the House Labor and Commerce Committee. On February 16, the Labor and Commerce Committee referred the bill without recommendation to the House Judiciary Committee.⁷⁸ On March 18, the House Judiciary Committee favorably reported on a committee substitute for HB 102 that included amendments to additional non-UCC statutory provisions.⁷⁹ On March 23, the Alaska House unanimously passed the committee substitute for HB 102.⁸⁰ The bill was referred to the Senate Labor and Commerce Committee on March 25, and is scheduled for a telephonic hearing on April 14.⁸¹

Massachusetts House Docket No. 89,⁸² which represents a fifth attempt to enact Revised Article 1 in the Commonwealth,⁸³ has yet to be assigned a live bill number.

⁷⁸ See http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_jrn_page.asp?session=26&bill=HB102&jrn=0259&hse=H (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).

⁷⁹ See http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_jrn_page.asp?session=26&bill=HB102&jrn=0496&hse=H (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).

⁸⁰ See http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_jrn_page.asp?session=26&bill=HB102&jrn=0561&hse=H (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).

⁸¹ See http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_bill.asp?bill=HB%20102&session=26 (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).

⁸² See <http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/house/186/ht00pdf/ht00089.pdf> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).

⁸³ In early 2005, Representative Paul Loscocco introduced what would become Massachusetts HB 3731. <http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/house/184/ht03pdf/ht03731.pdf> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). The bill was referred to the Joint Committee on Economic Development and Emerging Technologies, which held a public hearing on October 26, 2005. On March 23, 2006, the Massachusetts House extended the committee's deadline to report on the bill to June 23. On July 6, the Senate and House extended the reporting date to July 31. On August 17, the House extended the reporting date to January 2, 2007. See <http://www.mass.gov/legis/184history/h03731.htm> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). On January 11, 2007, Representative Paul Loscocco introduced Massachusetts HB 3924, which succeeded the previously unsuccessful HB 3731. On October 15, HB 4302 superseded HB 3924. See <http://www.mass.gov/legis/185history/h03924.htm> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). HB 4302 stalled in the Massachusetts House as did its predecessors. A 2003 effort to enact a version of Revised Article 1 including the original uniform version of R1-301 was also unsuccessful. See HB 91 (copy on file with the author).

On April 2, 2009, Maine Senator Barry Hobbins introduced LD 1403, which was promptly referred to the Joint Standing Committee on the Judiciary.⁸⁴

On February 17, 2009, the Oregon Senate Judiciary Committee introduced SB 558, at the Oregon Law Commission's request. Following a March 18 public hearing, the Judiciary Committee voted on March 20 to recommend passage with amendments. Amended SB 558 passed the Oregon Senate unanimously on March 25 and was referred on March 30 to the House Judiciary Committee.⁸⁵ As of April 10, it was not yet scheduled for a hearing.⁸⁶

Senators Adam Kline and Phil Rockefeller introduced Washington SB 5155 on January 15, 2009. It was promptly referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, which scheduled it for a public hearing on January 23.⁸⁷ At the initial public hearing, those testifying in favor of and in opposition to the bill unanimously opposed including original version of R1-301.⁸⁸ Informed sources in Washington are convinced that the bill will not proceed without replacing original R1-301 with the substitute the ALI and NCCUSL approved in 2008. As of April 10, no further action has been reported.

Scuttlebutt has a bill forthcoming in Georgia. However, as of April 10, the Georgia General Assembly's web site did not indicate that a Revised Article 1 bill was pending there.

⁸⁴ See <http://janus.state.me.us/legis/LawMakerWeb/dockets.asp?ID=280032538> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).

⁸⁵ See <http://www.leg.state.or.us/cgi-bin/searchMeas.pl> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).

⁸⁶ See <http://www.leg.state.or.us/09reg/agenda/webagendas.htm> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).

⁸⁷ See <http://apps.leg.wa.gov/billinfo/summary.aspx?bill=5155&year=2009> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).

⁸⁸ See <http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2009-10/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/Senate/5155%20SBA%20JUD%2009.pdf> (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).

III. What's a State to Do?

Everything else being constant, uniformity is good for commercial law and, in turn, for commerce, because the predictability fostered by uniformity reduces transaction costs and “levels the playing field” across jurisdictions. However, everything else rarely is constant, and uniformity may bear costs, as well as benefits, assuming it is even achievable.

A. Course of Performance

The decision to explicitly import course of performance into Revised Article 1 appears sound and carries with it no apparent cost. A widely-recognized principle of contract law counsels courts to look to the parties’ course of performance of a contract – sometimes referred to as the parties’ “practical construction” of the contract – when interpreting or construing that contract.⁸⁹ It is not surprising, therefore, that every state that has enacted Revised Article 1 to date has enacted Revised Section 1-303 as drafted.⁹⁰ A legislature enacting Revised Article 1 should enact Section R1-303 as drafted. Doing so will foster uniformity.

B. Choice of Law

The decision to allow parties to choose the law of some jurisdiction wholly unrelated to them or their transaction was contrary to the prevailing rules regarding contractual choice of law⁹¹ and was sufficiently problematic that none of the thirty-three states that had enacted

⁸⁹ See, e.g., *Moore v. Prindle*, 394 P.2d 352, 354 (Nev. 1964) (“In determining which contract is in effect the practical construction and interpretation of the parties as evidenced by their conduct is always persuasive, if not conclusive.” (citing *Reno Club v. Young Inv. Co.*, 182 P.2d 1011 (Nev. 1947), and *Flyge v. Flynn*, 166 P.2d 539 (Nev. 1946)); accord *Wiley v. Cook*, 583 P.2d 1076, 1078 n.2 (Nev. 1978). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(4) (1979); Keith A. Rowley, *Contract Construction and Interpretation: From the “Four Corners” to Parol Evidence (and Everything in Between)*, 69 MISS. L.J. 73, 147-49 (1999).

⁹⁰ See *supra* note 67 and accompanying text.

⁹¹ See *supra* notes 26-27 and accompanying text.

Revised Article 1 by May 1, 2008 had enacted uniform R1-301,⁹² prompting NCCUSL and ALI to promulgate a replacement uniform R1-301.⁹³ Enacting the replacement R1-301, which retains the essence of former Section 1-105, will foster uniformity across jurisdictions and consistent treatment of choice-of-law clauses in contracts governed by the law of a particular jurisdiction.

C. Scope

The decision to narrow Article 1's scope – notwithstanding the protestations of its drafters that they did not do so⁹⁴ – is not costless, although the benefits of uniformity may outweigh those costs. Sales of intangible or immovable personal property not governed by another article of the Code, which are within the scope of the version of Article 1 currently in force in twenty-one states and the District of Columbia, are excluded from the scope of Revised Article 1; therefore, parties to these sales will, *inter alia*, lose the protection of the Code's duty of good faith and fair dealing and of the default statute of frauds in pre-Revised Section 1-206.

Most states' courts recognize an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts.⁹⁵ Thus, in most states, parties to contracts excluded by Revised Article 1 appear to be protected from bad faith and unfair dealing without Section 1-203. On the other hand, most states lack another statute of frauds that will fill the gap left by the loss of Section 1-206. Some

⁹² See *supra* notes 68-69 and accompanying text. Illinois did not enact SB 2080 until August 22, 2008. See *supra* note 38

⁹³ See *supra* note 2.

⁹⁴ See *supra* note 5 and accompanying text.

⁹⁵ Compare, e.g., *Pemberton v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 858 P.2d 380, 382 (Nev. 1993); *R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. National Consumer Ins. Co.*, 773 A.2d 1132, 1148 (N.J. 2001); *Uptown Heights Assocs. v. Seafirst Corp.*, 891 P.2d 639, 643 (Or. 1995); *Wallace v. National Bank of Commerce*, 938 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tenn. 1996); *Rawson v. Conover*, 20 P.3d 876, 885 (Utah 2001) (all recognizing a common law duty) *with, e.g.*, *Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc.*, 84 S.W.3d 212, 225 (Tex. 2002) (refusing to recognize a common law duty in the absence of a "special relationship" between the parties or an express agreement imposing the duty). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, *supra* note 89, § 205.

may see that as a good thing. If a legislature does not, it appears to have four options: (1) do not enact Revised Article 1; (2) enact Revised Article 1, but without the new scope provision, Section R1-102; (3) enact Revised Article 1, but with an expanded scope provision that would encompass all sales of personal property not governed by another Article of the Code; or (4) enact Revised Article 1 and either amend an existing non-Code statute of frauds to include sales of personal property not governed by the revised Code⁹⁶ or enact a stand-alone statute of frauds covering sales of personal property not governed by the Code in the wake of Revised Article 1.⁹⁷ Enacting Section R1-102 as written and retaining a renumbered Section 1-206 is not

⁹⁶ See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-101(4) (2003) (barring any action “[u]pon a contract to sell or a sale of ... choses in action of the value of five hundred dollars or more” unless “the promise or agreement upon which the action is brought, or some memorandum thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged, or by some person by him thereunto lawfully authorized”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.210 & 111.220 (LexisNexis 2004) (requiring a subscribed writing evidencing any agreement to sell or lease any interest in real property for more than one year, any agreement not to be fully performed within one year, any promise to answer for another’s debt, any promise or agreement made upon consideration of marriage, any promise or commitment by a person engaged in the business of lending money to lend \$100,000 or more, and any promise or commitment to pay a fee of \$1,000 or more for obtaining a loan of money or extension of credit).

⁹⁷ For example, the legislation that resulted in California’s enactment of Revised Article 1 added a new section 1624.5 to the California Civil Code, effective January 1, 2007, which reads, in part:

(a) Except in the cases described in subdivision (b), a contract for the sale of personal property is not enforceable by way of action or defense beyond five thousand dollars (\$5,000) in amount or value of remedy unless there is some record ... that indicates that a contract for sale has been made between the parties at a defined or stated price, reasonably identifies the subject matter, and is signed, including by way of electronic signature, ... by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his or her authorized agent.

(b) Subdivision (a) does not apply to contracts governed by the Commercial Code, including contracts for the sale of goods (Section 2201 of the Commercial Code), contracts for the sale of securities (Section 8113 of the Commercial Code), and security agreements (Sections 9201 and 9203 of the Commercial Code).

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624.5 (West Supp. 2009); see also, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-4(7) (West Supp. 2009) (providing that “No action shall be brought ... [e]xcept in cases to which the Uniform Commercial Code (Title 6A) applies, ... to charge any person upon any contract for the sale of personal property beyond five thousand dollars (\$5,000) in an amount or value or remedy, unless the promise or agreement upon which the action shall be brought, or some note or memorandum thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by some other person by him or her thereunto lawfully authorized.”).

an option because, in light of Section R1-102, a statute of frauds in Revised Article 1 would not apply to any transactions.⁹⁸

Thus far, the states that have enacted Revised Article 1 have not addressed the effects of its narrowed scope provision, and nothing I have read or heard suggests that any state has declined to enact Revised Article 1 because of Section R1-102's effects. Enacting Section R1-102 as written will foster uniformity. That said, a legislature enacting Revised Article 1 without Section R1-102, or with an amended Section R1-102 that broadens the scope of Revised Article 1 to include transactions that are within the implied scope of current Article 1, should have a negligible impact on commerce, as the net effect would be to keep the scope of Revised Article 1 the same as that of current Article 1. Enacting or amending a non-UCC statute of frauds to require a signed writing evidencing a contract for the sale of personal property not governed by Article 2 or 8 should, likewise, have a negligible impact on commerce, as the net effect would be to require a signed writing only in cases in which current law already does so.

D. Good Faith

The only real disagreement among the states that have enacted Revised Article 1 thus far is whether to enact Revised Article 1's unitary good faith standard or retain a bifurcated standard that holds merchants and others assumed to have knowledge of commercially reasonable practices to a higher good faith standard than it does non-merchants and others assumed not to

⁹⁸ Nonetheless, this appears to be what Indiana's enactment of Revised Article 1 has done. As enacted and codified, P.L. 143 did not replace existing Article 1 in its entirety. Rather, it deleted certain specified provisions, amended others, and added yet others. P.L. 143 narrowed the scope of Article 1, *see* IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-1-101(2) (West Supp. 2008), but neither deleted nor amended current Section 26-1-1-206, *see* IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-1-206 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008). By contrast, although Florida's Revised Article 1 enactment also took the form of selective amendments, it expressly repealed former 1-206 effective January 1, 2008. *See* FLA. STAT. ANN. § 671.206 (West Supp. 2009).

have knowledge of commercially reasonable practices.⁹⁹ At this point in time, enough states have adopted the uniform version, and enough have declined to do so, that it is difficult to claim that either action will promote interstate uniformity.

Assuming that pre-Revised Section 1-201(19) affords non-merchants at least as much protection in U.C.C. transactions as a state's common law duty of good faith and fair dealing would afford them in a non-U.C.C. transaction, the key question seems to be whether enacting uniform Section R1-201(b)(20) would afford non-merchants less protection than a state's common law duty of good faith and fair dealing. If so, and assuming further that a legislature does not wish to erode the good faith protection afforded non-merchants in transactions governed by its current U.C.C., then it could reject the unitary good faith standard of uniform Section R1-201(b)(20), and leave pre-Revised Section 1-201(19) and Sections 2-103(1)(b) and 2A-103(3) in place to retain the current merchant/non-merchant distinction.¹⁰⁰ Alternatively, a legislature could alter the language of Section R1-201(b)(20), so that the unitary standard would apply "except as otherwise provided in Articles 2, 2A, and 5," and leave Sections 2-103(1)(b) and 2A-103(3) in place to retain the current merchant/non-merchant distinction.

⁹⁹ *See supra* note 16.

¹⁰⁰ *See supra* note 71.